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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court is currently considering a case
that could dramatically change American health care—all because
Congress eliminated a penalty tax on a party-line vote using a special
procedure designed to facilitate budget matters.1 The case is California
v. Texas,2 called United States v. Texas in the lower courts.3 The penalty
tax enforced the Affordable Care Act’s (“ACA”)4 individual mandate to
purchase health insurance, and it was lowered to zero in the 2017 Tax
Act under a streamlined Congressional procedure called budget
reconciliation.5 The Federal District Court for the Northern District of
*Professor of Law, Don L. and Mabel F. Dickason Professor, University of New Mexico
School of Law; Smith College, B.A., 1991; Georgetown University Law Center, J.D., 1996.
I am grateful to Professor Nathalie Martin for her insightful and helpful comments, to
Professor Ernesto Longa and to Nicholas Corbitt for their invaluable research assistance,
and to the University of New Mexico School of Law for its financial support of this
project. Opinions expressed in this Article are solely mine, as are any mistakes or
omissions.1Texas v. United States, 340 F. Supp. 3d 579 (N.D. Tex. 2018), aff’d in part,
vacated in part, remanded, 945 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. granted sub nom. California
v. Texas, 140 S. Ct. 1262 (2020) (No. 19-840). The case is an appeal from a Fifth Circuit
decision, Texas v. United States, 945 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2019), which in turn was an appeal
from the Northern District of Texas, Texas v. United States, 340 F. Supp. 3d 579 (N.D. Tex.
2018). Although this case was denominated as United States v. Texas in lower courts,
and previous scholarship and commentary uses that name, the case is now denominated
in the Supreme Court as California v. Texas. For simplicity, this Article will use California
v. Texas consistently when discussing the case, even if a lower court’s decision is being
discussed.
2 Texas v. United States, 340 F. Supp. 3d 579 (N.D. Tex. 2018), aff’d in part, vacated
in part, remanded, 945 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. granted sub nom. California v. Texas,
140 S. Ct. 1262 (2020) (No. 19-840).
3 Id.
4 What is commonly referred to as the Affordable Care Act is actually the
compilation of two different bills: Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No.
111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), as amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation
Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010). This Article uses the term “ACA”
to
refer
to
the
compilation
of
both
acts,
available
at
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ppacacon.pdf [hereinafter ACA].
5 Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017) [hereinafter 2017 Tax Act]. This
legislation was introduced as the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, but the short title was removed
because the reference to “jobs” in the title was deemed to be extraneous to the budget
and thus violated budget reconciliation rules under which the legislation was being
considered. Therefore, the law is technically called the “Act to provide for reconciliation
pursuant to titles II and V of the concurrent resolution on the budget for fiscal year
2018,” but is still often colloquially known as the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act or the TCJA. See
also Steve Akers, et al, The 2017 Tax Act, 52 U. MIAMI PHILIP E. HECKERLING INST. ON EST. PLAN.
Paragraph 100 (2018). This Article uses the more neutral 2017 Tax Act to reflect the
fact that the short title Tax Cuts and Jobs Act was actively removed as violating
Congressional procedure.
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Texas decided that the individual mandate could not be considered a
constitutional exercise of Congressional power without the penalty tax,
and further found that the individual mandate was not severable from
any portion of the ACA.6 In other words, the District Court found that
the now-unconstitutional individual mandate infected the entire ACA
and made it unconstitutional. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit agreed that
the individual mandate is unconstitutional without a higher-than-zero
penalty tax, but it remanded the case back to the District Court for
additional analysis on the severability question.7 Before the District
Court could provide this additional analysis, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to resolve the issue.8 Oral arguments were heard on
November 10, 2020, and a decision is expected in the summer of 2021.9
This leaves open the possibility that the entire ACA, or significant
portions of it, will be struck down by the Supreme Court.10
The ACA has fundamentally changed our health care system
through reforms that improve health care coverage, delivery, and
quality, and that lower cost. Because Congress lowered a tax in a budget
bill, you may be kicked off your parent’s health plan if you are 18 to 26
years old.11 Your pre-existing conditions may be excluded from
coverage altogether, or may cause your premiums to skyrocket.12 You
may lose the Premium Tax Credit that helps you afford insurance, or you
may lose access to lowered cost sharing that helps you afford your share

6 Texas v. United States, 340 F.Supp. 3d 579 (N.Dist. Tex. 2018), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part & remanded, 945 F.3d 355 (5th Circ. 2019) [hereinafter Texas D.Ct.].
7 Texas v. United States, 945 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. granted sub nom. Texas
v. California, No. 19-1019, 206 L. Ed. 2d 253, 2020 WL 981805 (Mar. 2, 2020)
[hereinafter Texas 5th Cir.].
8 Id.
9 California
v.
Texas,
SCOTUSBLOG,
https://www.scotusblog.com/casefiles/cases/california-v-texas/ (last visited Nov. 23, 2020).
10 Pundits are speculating based on the tenor of questions during oral arguments
that the Supreme Court will not strike down the entire ACA. See, e.g., Katie Keith,
Supreme Court Arguments: Even if Mandate Falls, Rest of Affordable Care Act Looks Likely
To
Be
Upheld,
Health
Affairs
Blog
(Nov.
11,
2020),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20201111.916623/full/.
Nevertheless, this result remains a distinct possibility, in part because since the court’s
National Federation of Independent Businesses v. Sebelius (“NFIB”) decision, Justices
Bader Ginsburg and Kennedy no longer sit on the court. Justices Kavanaugh and Coney
Barrett have joined the bench. Justices 1789 to Present, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES, https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members_text.aspx (last visited Nov.
23, 2020); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) [hereinafter
NFIB].
11 ACA § 1001, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg–14.
12 ACA § 1201, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg–3; ACA § 1201, codified at 42 U.S.C. §
300gg–1.

PAREJA (DO NOT DELETE)

72

2/8/2021 5:57 PM

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

[Vol. 45:1

of medical costs.13 You may once again face the possibility of hitting a
lifetime cap if you have the misfortune of becoming catastrophically ill.14
You may lose your Medicaid coverage.15 You may lose the ability to
compare the quality and safety records of nursing homes.16 Government
programs that improve preventive care, that fund research regarding
treatment efficacy, that tie provider reimbursement to patient
outcomes, and that fund new approaches to lowering medical error may
cease.17 These are only some examples of what is at stake if the ACA is
entirely struck down as unconstitutional.
From the moment that the ACA was signed into law, it has been
under repeated attack, both in the courts and through the political
process. Various portions of the ACA have been challenged in court;
some of those court challenges have been successful and others have
not.18 The ACA, however, has remained largely intact despite court
decisions striking down portions of the law. Politicians have attempted
to pass legislation to overturn or fundamentally alter the ACA; some
important changes have been made legislatively, but outright repeal has
failed.19 President Trump’s executive branch has sought to weaken the
ACA administratively, and while those attempts have indeed weakened
the impact of the ACA, the ACA remains largely in force. The case
currently before the United States Supreme Court threatens to finally
kill the ACA in its entirety.
This Article examines the decisions of the lower courts in California
v. Texas as well as relevant United States Supreme Court precedent with
respect to the question of severability. Proceeding on the assumption
that the individual mandate is no longer constitutional, this Article
analyzes how the severability analysis should be applied in this case.
13

ACA § 1401, codified at 26 U.S.C. § 36B; ACA § 1402, codified at § 42 U.S.C. 18071.
ACA § 1001, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg–11.
15 ACA § 2001, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII).
16 ACA § 6103, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3.
17 See e.g., ACA Title IV, Subtitle B; ACA Title III, Subtitle F; ACA Title III, Subtitle A,
Part 1; ACA § 10607.
18 See e.g. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2580 (2012) (constitutionality of the individual
mandate and Medicaid expansion); Sissel v. United States Department of Health &
Human Services, 760 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (constitutionality of individual
responsibility payment); King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2485 (2015) (permissibility of
extending premium tax credits to federal exchanges as well as state exchanges); Maine
Community Health Options v. United States, 590 U.S. ___ (2020) (right of insurers to risk
corridor payments).
19 Johnathan Cohn, The ACA, Repeal, and the Politics of Backlash, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG,
Mar.
6,
2020,
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20200305.771008/full/. See also
Abbe R. Gluck, Mark Regan & Erica Turret, The Affordable Care Act’s Litigation Decade,
108 GEO. L.J. 1471 (2020).
14
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This Article explores budget reconciliation and what the choice to use
this procedure should tell us about Congressional intent. This Article
concludes that courts should have a very strong presumption in favor of
severability when the offending legislation was passed in a manner that
precluded the legislative body from directly repealing the statute. In
other words, a court should not do what the legislative body itself could
not do.
Part II of this Article provides background information on the ACA,
what it does, and the challenges it has faced. Part III provides
background on the 2017 Tax Act and budget reconciliation and explains
how the 2017 Tax Act impacted the ACA. Part IV examines the
severability question presented by the California v. Texas litigation and
provides analysis of how severability analysis should be applied in this
case. Part V concludes the Article.
II. THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT
A. Overview
The ACA represents a stark departure from the public health policy
of the American past. Prior to the 1920s, Americans typically paid cash
for treatment and health care was inexpensive because medical
knowledge and technology was not very advanced.20 Some limited
forms of health insurance started to develop in the 1920s as medical
technology advanced and the demand for hospital care rose.21
Employer-sponsored health care became popular during World War II
as a way for employers to boost employees’ economic well-being
without running afoul of the World War II-era wage control rules and in
response to demands for health care benefits made by newly-powerful
workers unions.22 Since then, health insurance for the adult, non-elderly
population has continued to be primarily employment based, leaving
the unemployed largely unprotected.23 The elderly generally receive
health care through Medicare, a federal program, while the “deserving”
20 Alex Blumberg and Adam Davidson, Accidents of History Created U.S. Health
System,
NAT’L
PUB.
RADIO
(Oct.
22,
2009),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=114045132.
21 Id. An early player in the health insurance market was Blue Cross.
22 Ezekiel J. Emanuel and Ron Wyden, Why Tie Health Insurance to a Job?, WALL ST. J.
(Dec. 10, 2008), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122887085038593345; BARRY
FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW 302 (3d ed. 2015).
23 Paul Fronstin, Sources of Health Insurance and Characteristics of the Uninsured:
Analysis of the March 2011 Current Population Survey, 362 EMP. BENEFITS RESEARCH INST. 4
(Sept.
2013)
https://www.ebri.org/content/sources-of-health-insurance-andcharacteristics-of-the-uninsured-analysis-of-the-march-2013-current-populationsurvey-5272.
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poor (children and those unable to work due to disability) generally
receive health care through Medicaid, a federal-state partnership.24
Even with these federal and federal-state programs, the majority of
health care is provided through employers.25
Before the ACA, unemployed people faced serious difficulty in
finding and maintaining health coverage. In addition, employees of
smaller companies frequently do not have employer-provided health
coverage, because their employers frequently are unable to offer
coverage because of cost or administrative obstacles.26 Even the
passage of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(“ERISA”), which fundamentally altered employment-sponsored benefit
plans, left health care virtually untouched. In fact, ERISA created a sort
of “health care black hole” by preempting state efforts to regulate selffunded plans while putting into place only limited federal rules.27 Only
with the advent of the ACA has the federal government seriously
attempted to methodically address health coverage for the adult nonelderly population.
With the passage of the ACA, American society had hoped that the
era of health and financial insecurity due to lack of health insurance
would begin to fade into history. The ACA utilizes a uniquely American
approach to expanding health care coverage. Rather than opting for a
more socialized path to expanded coverage, such as having government
provide health care directly or having government be the sole or
primary payer of health care expenses, the ACA continues the American
tradition of placing private insurance companies at the heart of the
health care financing system.28
24

Nicole Huberfeld, Federalizing Medicaid, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 431, 432 (2011).
Health Coverage of the Total Population, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND.,
https://www.kff.org/other/state-indicator/totalpopulation/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,
%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D(last visited Jan. 12, 2020).
26 Fronstin, supra note 23, at 11.
27 Hinda Ripps Chaikind, CRS Report for Congress: ERISA Regulation of Health Plans:
Fact Sheet, CRS Report for Congress: Received through the CRS Web (Mar. 6, 2003),
https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20030306_RS20315_06391c3dd8dee6d755db
573ba96efd09f32ed668.pdf. Employer-sponsored health coverage funded through
insurance, rather than being self-funded by the sponsor, is subject to the very limited
ERISA rules and health insurance regulations imposed by the state. Id.
28 Compare The Commonwealth Fund, The United States Health Care System, 2014,
in 2014 INT’L PROFILES OF HEALTH CARE SYS. 153–162 (January 2015) (the primary U.S.
health system where private sector providers are paid for services via private sector
insurance companies), with Ruth Thorlby & Sandeepa Arora, The English Health Care
System, 2014 in 2014 INT’L PROFILES OF HEALTH CARE SYS. 43–52 (The Commonwealth
Fund January 2015) (the health system of England where the vast majority of providers
are employed directly by the governmental National Health Service (a system similar to
25
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The Supreme Court described the aim of the ACA as “to increase the
number of Americans covered by health insurance and decrease the cost
of health care.”29 It is clear that one of the primary goals of the ACA is to
dramatically expand health care coverage, and that a corollary goal is to
put coverage within reach of the average American by making coverage
more affordable. These are not the only goals of the ACA, however.30
The ACA also seeks to improve the quality and efficiency of the health
care system (by, for example, rating hospitals’ performance with respect
to quality of care) and to eliminate or reduce “junk” health plans and
ensure meaningful insurance coverage (by, for example, mandating a
certain minimum level of benefits).31 In addition, the ACA operates
somewhat as an omnibus health care act. It includes numerous
provisions that advance public health or improve health care quality
and that are either unrelated or tangentially related to the more-talkedabout goals of insurance access and health care cost. As examples of
lesser-known, but still important, ACA provisions, the Fifth Circuit
pointed to ACA requirements that certain chain restaurants disclose
nutritional information and the ACA modification of health care fraud
rules.32
At the time that the ACA was passed, it was thought that there were
three interlocking, core provisions affecting access to market-based
individual insurance coverage. The Supreme Court described these
provisions as follows: “First, the Act bars insurers from taking a person’s
health into account when deciding whether to sell health insurance or
how much to charge. Second, the Act generally requires each person to
maintain insurance coverage or make a payment to the Internal
Revenue Service. And third, the Act gives tax credits to certain people

the U.S. Veteran’s Health Administration)), and Isabelle Durand-Zaleski, The French
Health Care System, 2014 in 2014 INT’L PROFILES OF HEALTH CARE SYS. 53–62 (The
Commonwealth Fund January 2015) (the health system of France where private sector
providers are reimbursed directly by the government (a system similar to U.S.
Medicare)). While Medicare, Medicaid, and Tricare are important public health care
payers in the United States, most Americans continue to be covered by employersponsored health plans. Health Coverage of the Total Population, supra note 25. In 2018,
private insurance, most frequently through group employer-based plans, covered
approximately 55% of the population, government programs covered approximately
35% of the population, and approximately 9% of the population was uninsured. Id.
29 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2580 (2012).
30 For an excellent overview of the different goals of the ACA and the specific
provisions that promote those goals, see Wilton B. Hyman, An Explanation of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, 38 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 579 (2012).
31 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(o) (Supp. 2015), 42 U.S.C. §§ 18022(a)(1), (b)(1) (Supp.
2014).
32 Texas 5th Cir, 945 F.3d at 401 (2019).

PAREJA (DO NOT DELETE)

76

2/8/2021 5:57 PM

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

[Vol. 45:1

to make insurance more affordable.”33 These provisions are commonly
referred to as Preexisting Condition Protection, the Individual Mandate,
and Premium Tax Credits, and they were designed to make marketbased insurance more accessible to individuals. Each of these
provisions is discussed in more detail below.
In addition to these three provisions that the Supreme Court
labeled “core,” there are other very important provisions that affect
efficient market-based health care coverage. To make it easier for
individuals and small businesses to shop for and purchase health
coverage, the ACA required each state to set up an Amazon-style online
exchange (also called a marketplace) with standardized features.34 If a
state failed (or refused) to set up an exchange, the federal government
was tasked with creating and operating an exchange on behalf of that
state.35 Much like the Medigap supplemental insurance rules, the ACA
sought to standardize individual policies to facilitate comparison
shopping by creating a set of relatively standardized covered services
and by establishing metal-rating levels indicating the required amount
of cost-sharing under the policies.36 The ACA reduced cost sharing for
lower income individuals enrolled in certain marketplace plans.37 The
ACA established mechanisms to protect the insurance industry during
ACA implementation (risk sharing corridors and reinsurance), and on
an ongoing basis (risk adjustment).38 The ACA required that premiums
be established using modified community rating, rather than using
actual claims experience.39
There are other provisions that are core to the overall goal of
increased coverage without respect to the source of that coverage.
While the ACA utilized a market-driven approach to increase health
insurance coverage, that was not the only approach pursued. As
discussed more below, the ACA attempted to expand Medicaid to cover
all lower-income individuals, even able-bodied adults, which is a major

33

King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2485 (2015).
ACA § 1311(b), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18031(b), (d); see The Affordable Care Act:
A Brief Summary, NCSL (Mar. 2011), https://www.ncsl.org/portals /1/
documents/health/HRACA.pdf.
35 ACA § 1311(b), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18041(c).
36 ACA § 1302, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18022(c), (d).
37 Id.
38 ACA § 1341–1343, codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 18061–18063; see Cynthia Cox et al.,
Explaining Health Care Reform: Risk Adjustment, Reinsurance, and Risk Corridors, THE
HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Aug. 2016), http://files.kff.org/attachment/Issue-BriefExplaining-Health-Care-Reform-Risk-Adjustment-Reinsurance-and-Risk-Corridors.
39 ACA § 2701, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg.
34
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shift from traditional Medicaid eligibility criteria.40 The ACA mandated
that larger employers offer health coverage of a certain quality or face a
penalty.41 It also required that dependent children be allowed to remain
on their parents’ insurance until age twenty-six.42 Further, the ACA
prohibited lifetime caps on benefits.43 This is a non-exhaustive list.
B. Select ACA Provisions: Demonstrating Continuing
Effectiveness of the ACA Without an Individual Mandate
The courts in California v. Texas are grappling with the question of
whether, now that the penalty tax has been lowered to zero, the
individual mandate is still a constitutional exercise of Congressional
power. This Article proceeds on the assumption that it is not, even
though the parties are actively arguing this issue. Even without an
individual mandate, however, many core provisions of the ACA would
continue to remain effective and if left in place would continue to
advance the goals of the Congress that passed the ACA and of the
subsequent Congresses that have left most of the ACA in place.
1. Protections for Individuals with Preexisting
Conditions
The provision of the ACA that is most closely tied to the individual
mandate is the protection for individuals with pre-existing conditions.
The ACA extends access to coverage for people with medical conditions
that previously prevented them from obtaining coverage or that
qualified them only for coverage with an insurmountably high price tag.
Specifically, the ACA prohibits insurers from excluding coverage for preexisting conditions (i.e., covering conditions other than the one which
the individual already has) or otherwise discriminating based on health
status;44 it requires insurers to issue policies without respect to preexisting conditions (guaranteed availability);45 it requires insurers to
renew policies without respect to preexisting conditions or claims
experience;46 and it prohibits insurers from basing premiums on health
40 ACA § 2001, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII); see The Affordable
Care
Act:
A
Brief
Summary,
NCSL
(Mar.
2011),
https://www.ncsl.org/portals/1/documents/health/HRACA.pdf.
41 ACA § 1513, codified at 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(a), (c)(2); see The Affordable Care Act:
A
Brief
Summary,
NCSL
(Mar.
2011),
https://www.ncsl.org/portals/1/documents/health/HRACA.pdf.
42 ACA § 1001, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg–14.
43 ACA § 1001, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg–11.
44 ACA § 1201, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-3.
45 ACA § 1201, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1.
46 ACA § 1201, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-2.
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status, the receipt of health care, claims experience, or the existence of
a preexisting condition.47 This is one of the more politically popular
features of the law.48 Congress deemed the protections for persons with
pre-existing conditions so important that it mandated the nearly
immediate establishment (within 90 days of the passage of the ACA) of
a high risk pool to quickly provide coverage for the affected
individuals.49
Such strong protections for individuals with pre-existing medical
conditions risks creating adverse selection—a skewed market situation
where people buy health insurance (or buy better coverage) only once
they become ill which generally results in higher premium costs to cover
the higher risks of the insured population. To avoid creating adverse
selection, the ACA’s individual mandate requires most people in the
United States to have a minimum level of health care coverage.50
As discussed below, the Supreme Court upheld the individual
mandate in 2012 as a constitutional exercise of the federal
government’s taxation authority by reading the individual mandate in
conjunction with the penalty tax for not maintaining the required
coverage (the penalty tax is called the shared responsibility payment).51
Without the individual mandate, the pre-existing condition protections
are at risk, and it must be admitted that the two provisions are very
closely linked. The individual mandate, however, is not the only or even
the best method for preventing adverse selection. Robust enrollment
that includes healthy individuals is what prevents adverse selection and,
as discussed below, the ACA incentives like the Premium Tax Credit
have proven to be effective at boosting insurance enrollment.
2. Medicaid Expansion
The ACA expands access to health care coverage in several
important ways, many of which have already been attacked in the
courts. Medicaid expansion is undoubtedly one of the more significant
ways that Congress sought to expand access to coverage. The ACA
provides incentives for the states to expand eligibility for Medicaid
coverage to include all adults under age sixty-five with incomes up to

47

ACA § 2701, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg.
Poll: The ACA’s Pre‐Existing Condition Protections Remain Popular with the Public,
including Republicans, As Legal Challenge Looms This Week, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY
FOUND. (Sep. 5, 2018), https://www.kff.org/health-costs/press-release/poll-acas-preexisting-condition-protections-remain-popular-with-public/.
49 ACA § 1101, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18001.
50 26 U.S.C. § 5000A.
51 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2571 (2012).
48
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133% of poverty.52 Children in households with incomes up to 133% of
poverty were already eligible for Medicaid prior to the passage of the
ACA.53 The ACA made the Medicaid expansion mandatory for all states
and provided 100% funding from the federal government for the first
three years, gradually lowering the funding each year to 90% by 2020.54
The sanction for not implementing the expansion was the loss of all
federal funding for Medicaid—not just the funding for the expansion.55
The Supreme Court, however, found that the threat of withdrawing all
Medicaid funding violates the United States Constitution and struck
down that provision of the ACA.56 The Court explained that the federal
government can use incentives under its Spending Clause authority to
entice the states to enact programs, but only if the states voluntarily and
knowingly accept the terms of the program.57 The ACA Medicaid
expansion was deemed too dramatic a transformation of the program to
qualify as a mere amendment of an existing program, and the threat of
losing all funding was deemed to cross the line between encouragement
and coercion.58 The Court went on to find that the provision
withdrawing federal Medicaid funding was severable from the ACA as
whole, meaning that a state that does not accept the Medicaid expansion
may continue to operate under the prior Medicaid rules, effectively
making the Medicaid expansion voluntary.59
This decision, making the Medicaid expansion effectively voluntary
for the States, creates strange side effects. The Premium Tax Credit is
only available to taxpayers with household incomes between 100% and
400% of poverty, Medicaid expansion (if adopted by the state) is
52

42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII).
Right before the ACA was passed, federal law required Medicaid programs to
cover pregnant women and children aged 5 or under with household incomes at or
below 133% of poverty, and to cover children aged six through eighteen with household
income at or below 100% of poverty. Nicole Huberfeld, Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, &
Kevin Outterson, Plunging into Endless Difficulties: Medicaid And Coercion in National
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 93 B.U.L. REV. 1, 19 (2013). Despite this,
all states had made the permissible election for more generous eligibility criteria for
children, often using federal funding available through the Children’s Health Insurance
Program (or CHIP). Donna Cohan Ross & Caryn Marks, Challenges of Providing Health
Coverage for Children and Parents in a Recession: A 50 State Update on Eligibility Rules,
Enrollment and Renewal Procedures, and Cost‐Sharing Practices in Medicaid and SCHIP in
2009, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. at 6 (Jan. 2009), https://www.kff.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/01/7855.pdf.
54 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(y)(1).
55 42 U.S.C. § 1396c, invalidated by NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
56 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2608 (2012).
57 Id. at 2602.
58 Id. at 2603–04.
59 Id. at 2607.
53
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available up to 133% of poverty, and traditional Medicaid is often not
available to able-bodied, childless adults unless their incomes are
exceptionally low.60 Counterintuitively, a taxpayer with income at
100% of federal poverty may receive federally subsidized health care
coverage but a taxpayer with income below 100% of federal poverty
may not.61 This would have made sense if Medicaid expansion were
mandatory because the poorer person would have had access to
Medicaid, but that is no longer guaranteed.62 Additionally, in a state that
has not expanded Medicaid, poorer taxpayers with incomes under
100% of poverty frequently are not eligible for Medicaid are also not
eligible for federally subsidized coverage, yet they remain subject to the
individual mandate unless they apply for and receive an exception.63 It
is hard to imagine any rational Congress passing this combination of
rules; nonetheless, the Supreme Court decided that the rest of the ACA,
including its most significant provisions, could be severed from
mandatory Medicaid expansion, despite the anomalies created.64
The link between Medicaid expansion and expansion of access to
health coverage became more complicated, but is still vital. Many states
expanded Medicaid right away.65 While some states have not yet
expanded Medicaid,66 many adopted the expansion even after the
Supreme Court decision that permitted them to decline.67 States that
60

Huberfeld, Leonard, & Outterson, supra note 53, at 85-86.
Huberfeld, Leonard, & Outterson, supra note 53, at 85-86.
62 Huberfeld, Leonard, & Outterson, supra note 53, at 85-86.
63 Huberfeld, Leonard, & Outterson, supra note 53, at 85-86.
64 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. (2012).
65 The earliest possible Medicaid expansion effective date was January 1, 2014, and
the following states adopted Medicaid expansion at that time: Arizona, Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, and West Virginia. Status of State
Medicaid Expansion Decisions: Interactive Map, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., (Nov. 2,
2020),
https://www.kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/state-activity-aroundexpanding-medicaid-under-the-affordable-care-act/
?activeTab=map&currentTimeframe=0&selectedDistributions=status-of-medicaidexpansiondecision&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22
%7D#note-4 (last visited Jan. 12, 2020).
66 States that have not yet adopted Medicaid expansion are as follows: Alabama,
Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Id. There is no deadline for a state to accept
the Medicaid expansion, so some states may later change their positions.
67 States that have adopted Medicaid expansion, but with delayed effective dates are
as follows: Michigan (Apr. 1, 2014), New Hampshire (Aug. 15, 2014), Pennsylvania (Jan.
1, 2015), Indiana (Feb. 1, 2015), Alaska (Sept. 1, 2015), Montana (Jan. 1, 2016), Louisiana
(Jul. 1, 2016), Virginia (Jan. 1, 2019), Maine (Jan. 1, 2019 with retroactive coverage),
Idaho (Jan. 1, 2020), Utah (Jan. 1, 2020), Nebraska (Oct. 1, 2020), Missouri (Jul. 1, 2021),
61
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have yet to adopt it continue to consider Medicaid expansion. For
example, the governor of Kansas announced in January 2020 that she
and the legislature had reached a bipartisan deal that she anticipated
would enable Medicaid expansion to pass the Kansas legislature in
2020, a full ten years after President Obama signed the ACA into law and
the Supreme Court struck down mandatory expansion, although that
effort ultimately stalled in the 2020 Kansas legislative session.68
Research has shown that Medicaid expansion positively correlates with
a lower uninsured population; in other words, Medicaid expansion
works to provide access to coverage.69 Despite the anomalies created
by voluntary Medicaid expansion, Congress’ vital goal of expanding
coverage advances even without mandatory expansion.
Similarly, it is now clear that the individual mandate and the tax
enforcing the individual mandate, while helpful, are not actually critical
to Congress’ goal of expanding coverage. Enrollment numbers have
remained strong, despite numerous administrative challenges that have
existed from the beginning.70 The IRS has always been limited in its
and Oklahoma (not later than Jul. 1, 2021). Status of State Medicaid Expansion Decisions:
Interactive Map, supra note 65. Several of these states modified the Medicaid expansion
rules through a Section 1115 waiver approved by the federal government. Id. Section
1115 of the Social Security Act authorizes the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services (“HHS”) to “waive provisions of Section 1902 of the Medicaid Act
for a limited period of time to allow states to engage in innovative ‘experimental, pilot,
or demonstration’ projects that are ‘likely to assist in promoting the objectives of [the
Medicaid Act].’” Sidney D. Watson, Out of the Black Box and Into the Light: Using Section
1115 Medicaid Waivers to Implement the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid Expansion, 15
YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 213, 214 (2015) (quoting Social Security Act § 1115(a),
42 U.S.C. § 1315(a)(1)(2012)); see also Mary Pareja, Humanizing Work Requirements for
Safety Net Programs, 39 PACE L. REV. 833, 852-53 (2019).
68 Mitch Smith and Abby Goodnough, Expanding Medicaid Was a Pipe Dream in
Kansas. Now It May Become Reality., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2020,
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/09/us/kansas-medicaid-expansion.html; see also
Louise Norris, Kansas and the ACA’s Medicaid expansion, HEALTHINSURANCE.ORG, (Dec. 7,
2019), https://www.healthinsurance.org/kansas-medicaid/ (last visited Nov. 14,
2020). Medicaid expansion has been a bitter fight in Kansas, with the governor vetoing
expansion in 2017 and expansion passing the house but dying in the Senate in 2019. Id.
69 A Commonwealth Fund survey found that the non-elderly adult uninsured rate
fell nationwide from 20% to 15% after the ACA’s first open enrollment period. Among
those living below the poverty line, the uninsured rate fell a dramatic 11% (from 28%
to 17%) in states that expanded Medicaid versus a paltry 2% drop in states without a
Medicaid expansion. Sara R. Collins, Petra W. Rasmussen & Michelle M. Doty, Gaining
Ground: Americans’ Health Insurance Coverage and Access to Care After the ACA’s First
Open Enrollment Period, The COMMONWEALTH FUND (July 10, 2014),
https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/issue-briefs/2014/jul/gainingground-americans-health-insurance-coverage-and-access (last visited Nov. 14, 2020).
70 Marketplace Enrollment, 2014‐2020: Trend Graph, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND.,
(last
visited
Dec.
20,
2020),
https://www.kff.org/health-reform/stateindicator/marketplace-
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ability to enforce the penalty tax; the law allows the IRS to offset refunds
to pay an outstanding penalty tax but prohibits the IRS from using other
enforcement mechanisms, such as garnishments, liens, and levies.71
From 2014 through 2016, the IRS accepted so-called “silent tax
returns”—returns in which the taxpayer leaves the question about
health insurance coverage unanswered.72 The Trump administration
shortened open enrollment periods,73 slashed funding for education and
outreach to boost enrollment,74 sought to advance alternative insurance
such as short term policies and association health plans that are allowed
to offer less than the federal minimum essential benefits and also escape
state coverage mandates,75 and generally received criticism for
attempting to “sabotage” the ACA because outright repeal has proven
elusive.76 The 2017 Tax Act lowered the penalty tax to zero effective
January 1, 2019.77 Despite all this, enrollment numbers have remained
strong.78 It appears that the availability of subsidized coverage (the
enrollment/?activeTab=graph&currentTimeframe=0&startTimeframe=6&sortModel=
%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D (showing that
marketplace enrollment has been trending downward under the Trump administration
(since 2016), but the downward trend is relatively flat and certainly not as marked as
the initial enrollment surge was during the first two years of the marketplace).
71 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(g).
72 Louise Norris, Will the IRS Still Enforce the Individual Mandate Penalty for 2018
Tax
Returns?,
HEALTHINSURANCE.ORG,
(Jan.
17,
2019),
https://www.healthinsurance.org/faqs/does-the-presidents-executive-order-meanthe-irs-wont- enforce-the-individual-mandate-penalty/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2020). The
IRS rejected “silent” returns for tax years 2017 and 2018, which counterintuitively
represents an increase in enforcement right at the time that Congress voted to eliminate
the penalty in the 2017 Tax Act. The IRS had planned to start rejecting silent returns for
2016 returns, but reversed course in response to an executive order signed by President
Trump on his first day in office that directed agencies to use any discretion they had to
waive or delay provisions or requirements of the ACA that “impose a fiscal burden on
any State or a cost, fee, tax, penalty, or regulatory burden on individuals, families,
healthcare providers, health insurers, patients, recipients of healthcare services,
purchasers of health insurance, or makers of medical devices, products, or
medications.” Exec. Order No. 13765, 82 Fed. Reg. 8351, 8531 (Jan. 24, 2017).
73 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Market Stabilization, 82 Fed. Reg.
18,346, 18,346 (Apr. 18, 2017) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 147, 155-56).
74 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-565, HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGES: HHS
SHOULD ENHANCE ITS MANAGEMENT OF OPEN ENROLLMENT PERFORMANCE, (July 2018).
75 Exec.
Order No. 13813, 82 Fed. Reg. 48385 (Oct. 17, 2017),
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2017-10-17/pdf/2017-22677.pdf.
76 See generally Timothy S. Jost, The Affordable Care Act Under the Trump
Administration,
THE
COMMONWEALTH
FUND
(Aug.
30,
2018),
https://www.commonwealthfund.org/blog/2018/affordable-care-act-under-trumpadministration.
77 2017 Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11081, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017). The effective
date of the change is actually for “months beginning after December 31, 2018” because
the penalty tax was imposed on a monthly basis.
78 See Marketplace Enrollment, 2014‐2020: Trend Graph, supra note 70.

PAREJA (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

2/8/2021 5:57 PM

CALIFORNIA V. TEXAS

83

carrot) is much more effective at achieving enrollment than the threat
of the penalty tax (the stick). Just as the Supreme Court’s leaving the
ACA in place despite the seemingly crucial mandatory Medicaid
expansion facilitated the advancement of Congress’ goal of expanded
access to coverage, so too the California v. Texas court has the
opportunity to leave in place the ACA mechanisms that advance
expanded access, even if it ultimately decides that the individual
mandate itself is no longer constitutional.
3.

Employer Mandate

Similar to the individual mandate coupled with the penalty tax, the
ACA also mandates that larger employers provide health care coverage
to their employees or face potential penalties (commonly called the
“employer mandate”).79 This provision applies only to employers who
had an average of fifty full-time employees in the prior year.80 An
employer incurs the penalty only if one of the employer’s full-time
employees enrolls in a plan through a Marketplace exchange and
receives a Premium Tax Credit or is eligible for reduced cost sharing.81
The employer mandate and employer penalty tax were not changed by
the 2017 Tax Act, despite facing criticism since the ACA’s passage.82 This

79

26 U.S.C. §§ 4980H(a), (c)(2).
Id.
81 Id. The issue of whether Premium Tax Credits are available in states that have not
established their own exchanges was resolved in the affirmative by the United States
Supreme Court in King v. Burwell. King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 498 (2015). The statute
requires that the individual be enrolled “through an Exchange established by the State
. . .” 26 U.S.C. § 36B(c)(2)(A)(i). The IRS interpreted this to include exchanges
established by the federal government on behalf of states that declined to establish their
own exchanges. 26 C.F.R. § 1.36B-1(k); Health Insurance Premium Tax Credit, 77 Fed.
Reg. 30377–78 (May 23, 2012) (the preamble explains the IRS’s reasoning for adopting
this rule). This interpretation generated intense controversy, but ultimately the Fourth
Circuit unanimously upheld the IRS’s interpretation as a permissible exercise of the
IRS’s discretion to interpret ambiguous statutes, and the Supreme Court reached the
IRS’s same conclusion through its own independent analysis. King, 576 U.S. at 493. The
litigation was exceptionally important to the employer mandate because if a person
living in a state that has not established its own exchange is not eligible for a Premium
Tax Credit or reduced cost sharing because their only option is a federally-facilitated
exchange, then that person’s employer also may escape the penalty for not offering
health coverage to that employee, effectively gutting the employer mandate. 26 U.S.C. §
4980H(a), (c)(2).
82 The Current Status of the ACA Employer Mandate: 2020, Integrity Data, updated
Sept. 15, 2019, https://www.integrity-data.com/blog/current-status-of-aca-employermandate-2019/. The effective date of the employer mandate, originally scheduled for
2014, was delayed because of concerns about the provision. Internal Revenue Service,
Questions and Answers on Employer Shared Responsibility Provisions Under the Affordable
Care Act, Question 2, https://www.irs.gov/affordable-care-act/employers/questions80
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also sheds light on Congress’ intent in lowering the individual mandate
penalty to zero, as related to the severability question. Congress could
have similarly lowered the employer mandate to zero, even using the
budget reconciliation process. The 2017 Tax Act Congress, however,
chose not to do so, instead leaving in place a politically unpopular
mandate and penalty tax. For a judge to do what Congress chose not to
do, under the guise of the constitutional severability doctrine, is simply
legislating from the bench.
4.

Affordability Rules

The ACA takes several steps to help people afford what, for many,
is the significant new expense of health care coverage. First, those who
are newly eligible for Medicaid as a result of the expansion will receive
quality coverage with low to no cost sharing or premiums.83 Second, the
ACA implements limits on cost sharing (deductibles, coinsurance, and
copayments) that a lower-income or middle-income individual will
face.84 Third, the federal government created a new refundable income
tax credit called the “Premium Tax Credit” to help offset the cost of
health coverage for lower-income and middle-income taxpayers.85 The
Premium Tax Credit is a significant part of the overall ACA strategy.
Indeed, 85% of people who enrolled in an exchange plan during the first
open enrollment period for coverage in 2014 qualified for advance
payments of the Premium Tax Credit.86 Without the Premium Tax
Credit, premium costs likely would keep coverage out of reach for many
Americans.
The Premium Tax Credit is a subsidy designed to help low-income
to middle-income taxpayers afford to buy health insurance on an
exchange. Generally speaking, a person is eligible for a Premium Tax
Credit if he or she has a household income between 100% and 400% of
and-answers-onemployer-shared-responsibility-provisions-under-the-affordablecare-act#Limited (last visited Nov. 14, 2020).
83 See supra Part II.B.2.
84 42 U.S.C. § 18071 (2010); HHS Notice of Benefit and Payment Parameters for
2016, 80 Fed. Reg. 10750, 10826 (Feb. 27, 2015) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 145,
147, 153, 154, 155, 156, and 158). Cost sharing reductions can apply for individuals
with household income between 100% and 250% of poverty, on a sliding scale basis. To
receive the cost sharing reductions, the taxpayer is required to enroll in a silver plan. Id.
Special, more generous, rules apply to Native Americans. Id. at 10799. See infra note
100 and accompanying text regarding the classification of health insurance policies by
precious metals.
85 ACA §1401, codified at 26 U.S.C. § 36B (2006).
86 OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SEC’Y FOR PLANNING AND EVALUATION, DEP’T OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES, HEALTH INSURANCE MARKETPLACE: SUMMARY ENROLLMENT REPORT FOR THE
INITIAL
ANNUAL
OPEN
ENROLLMENT
PERIOD
9
(May
1,
2014),
https://aspe.hhs.gov/system/files/pdf/76876/ib_2014Apr_enrollment.pdf.
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poverty, purchases health insurance on an ACA exchange, and is not
otherwise eligible for or actually covered by a qualifying employer or
public health plan.87 Similar to the Earned Income Tax Credit (“EITC”),
the Premium Tax Credit is a refundable tax credit.88 This credit will
reduce the taxpayer’s tax liability (as shown on the return) to as low as
zero, and if there is credit left over, the taxpayer will receive that left
over credit amount as a refund.89 Taxpayers may claim the Premium
Tax Credit retroactively on a tax return; the credit for any month in 2014
would be claimed on a 2014 tax return, normally filed before April 15,
2015.90 The Premium Tax Credit also may be paid on an advanced
basis.91 If the advance credit is elected, the estimated amount of the
credit is calculated by the health insurance exchange through which the
person obtained the coverage and payments are made directly to the
insurance company covering the individual.92 Advance credit payments
are reconciled on the tax return for the year of the payments, meaning
advance payments made during 2014 were reconciled on the tax return
for 2014, which would normally have been filed before April 15, 2015.93
If the actual amount of the credit on the tax return is less than the
advance payments made during the year, the taxpayer must pay back
the difference, subject to certain repayment caps.94 If the actual amount
87 26 U.S.C. § 36B (2006). For a more detailed explanation of the eligibility rules for
the Premium Tax Credit, see Mary Pareja, Beyond the Affordable Care Act’s Premium Tax
Credit: Ensuring Access to Safety Net Programs, 38 HAMLINE L. REV. 241 (2015). The
federal poverty figures used for the Premium Tax Credit are published by the
Department of Health and Human Services in the Federal Register at the start of every
year. 26 U.S.C. § 36B(d)(3) (2006). The figures that apply for a year are the mostrecently published figures as of the beginning of the open enrollment period for that
year. Id. The open enrollment period for 2020 began November 1, 2019. Key 2020 Open
Enrollment
Dates,
HealthCare.gov
Blog
(Aug.
22,
2019),
https://www.healthcare.gov/blog/2020-open-enrollment-key-dates/.
Thus, the
poverty figures that apply for 2020 are the figures published at the start of 2018. For
2018, the poverty line for a single individual not living in Alaska or Hawaii is $12,140;
each additional family member adds $4320 to the poverty line. Annual Update of HHS
Poverty Guidelines, 83 Fed. Reg. 2642, 2643 (Jan. 18, 2018). Thus, for 2018, between
100% and 400% of poverty for a single person means between $12,140 and $48,560.
The poverty line is higher in Alaska and Hawaii. Id.
88 26 U.S.C. §§ 36B(b)(2).
89 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, Questions and Answers on the Premium Tax Credit,
Question
1,
https://www.irs.gov/affordable-care-act/individuals-andfamilies/questions-and-answers-on-the-premium-tax-credit (last visited Nov. 14,
2020).
90 26 U.S.C. § 36B(a).
91 42 U.S.C. § 18082 (2010).
92 Id.
93 26 U.S.C. § 36B(f).
94 Id. See also INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 89. While advance credit
payments may make health insurance accessible by solving a cash flow problem,
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of the credit on the tax return is greater than the advance payments
made during the year, the taxpayer will receive the excess amount as a
refundable credit.95
The tax code calculates the Premium Tax Credit based on the
taxpayer’s family size,96 household income,97 and the cost for a
advance credit payments also create the risk that the taxpayer will have a nasty surprise
come tax time. This risk can be mitigated by opting to receive only a portion of the
expected credit amount on an advanced basis. The taxpayer can also mitigate this risk
by diligently reporting to the exchange every month changes to the taxpayer’s
household income or family size, which will adjust the advance credit payments made
to the insurance company. In the author’s experience working with low-income
taxpayers through a low-income tax clinic, this sort of diligence is likely to be the
exception, rather than the rule. Persons living in poverty typically have more urgent
matters that occupy their attention and time, such as finding their next meal (especially
at the end of the month when the food stamps have long been exhausted), picking
between paying the gas or electricity bill, and coordinating the family’s transportation
to and from school and work often with no car and limited public transportation.
95 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 89.
96 “Family” consists of all the individuals “for whom a taxpayer is allowed” to claim
a “personal exemption amount” under Code § 151 for the taxable year. 26 U.S.C. §
36B(d)(1) (2017). Code § 151 generally allows a taxpayer to deduct from his or her
income a “personal exemption amount” for themselves, their spouse if filing jointly, and
for eligible dependents claimed on the return. 26 U.S.C. §§ 151(a)–(c) (2017). Thus,
“family” for ACA purposes refers to the tax unit and not the common understanding of
family. See generally Tessa R. Davis, Taxing Modern Families: Mapping the Families of
Tax, 22 VA. J. SOC.POL’Y & L. 179 (2015) (discussing the Code’s broad conceptions of family
and how the Code’s conceptions of family compare to family law’s conceptions of
family). The following broad categories of people potentially qualify as dependents
when the corresponding requirements are met: (1) qualifying children: the taxpayer’s
descendants, siblings, and sibling’s descendants (nieces and nephews, grand-nieces and
grand-nephews, etc.) provided the dependent is unmarried, lives with the taxpayer for
a majority of the year, is under age 19, is a full-time student and under age 24, or any
age but permanently disabled, and does not provide a majority of the individual’s
financial support; and (2) qualifying relatives: almost anyone that lives with the
taxpayer as part of the household for the entire year as well as the taxpayer’s
descendants, siblings, nieces and nephews (but not grand-nieces and grand-nephews),
direct ancestors, and aunts and uncles (but not their descendants), provided the
dependent makes less than the personal exemption amount for the year and the
taxpayer provides for more than half of the dependent’s financial support. 26 U.S.C. §§
152(c)–(d) (2017). This is merely a broad summary of the rules; there are many
wrinkles and exceptions that are beyond the scope of this Article. Thus, for ACA
purposes, a “family” includes the taxpayer, the taxpayer’s spouse, and the taxpayer’s
dependents as described above. In addition, there are exceptions and special rules for
non-citizens. 26 U.S.C. §152(b)(3) (2017).
97 “Household income” is based on “modified adjusted gross income,” which begins
with the taxpayer’s “adjusted gross income.” 26 U.S.C. § 36B(d)(2)(2017). Adjusted
gross income is the taxpayer’s gross income as reported on his or her return less certain
“above-the-line” deductions, such as the deduction for certain tuition payments and
certain deductions for self-employed individuals. 26 U.S.C. §§ 62(a)(6), (18) (2020).
The IRS modifies adjusted gross income by adding back any amounts excluded under
the foreign income exclusion of Code § 911, any tax-exempt interest, and any portion of
Social Security benefits excluded under Code § 86. 26 U.S.C. § 36B(d)(2)(B) (2017).
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benchmark plan (or the cost for the actual plan selected, if lower).98 The
benchmark plan is the second-lowest priced “silver” plan that can cover
the taxpayer’s entire household.99 The ACA exchanges categorize plans
by “metal colors”; plans are classified in ascending order from least
generous to most generous, i.e., bronze, silver, gold, and platinum.100 In
comparison, a silver plan benefit structure (the amount of copayments,
coinsurance, and deductibles) is more generous than a bronze plan but
less generous than a gold or platinum plan.101 The cost for the
benchmark plan is the cost to the taxpayer if he or she were to actually

There are clear inequities in using this definition to measure an individual’s ability to
afford health care. For example, inherited or gifted wealth is completely excluded from
this definition of income. See 26 U.S.C. § 36B(d)(2)(B) (2017). This exclusion means a
person could qualify for the Premium Tax Credit even if the person receives thousands,
or even millions of dollars, from a family trust. “Household income” is the modified gross
income of each member of the “family,” or tax unit, with an important exception. 26
U.S.C. §§ 5000A(c)(4)(B)–(C) (2019). The IRS ignores income of a family member (i.e., a
spouse or dependent) if the family member is not “required to file a return of tax
imposed by [Code] section 1 for the taxable year.” 26 U.S.C. § 36B(d)(2)(A)(ii)(II)
(2017). Code § 1 is the section that imposes the income tax; it does not contain any rules
regarding the requirement to file a return. See 26 U.S.C § 1 (2019). Code § 6012 contains
the rules regarding when there is a requirement to file a return to report taxes imposed
under Code § 1. See 26 U.S.C. § 6012 (2018). Code § 6012 exempts an individual from
the obligation to file a return to report the tax applicable under Code § 1 if the
individual’s income is not more than the personal exemption amount (currently $0) plus
the applicable standard deduction amount (for most single taxpayers in 2020 this is
$12,400 and for most married couples this is $24,800). 26 U.S.C. §§ 6012(a)(1)(A)–(B)
(2018); see also Publication 501 (2019), Dependents, Standard Deduction, and Filing
Information, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., at 2, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p501.pdf
(last updated Jan. 13, 2020). In other words, for ACA purposes, a family member’s
income (including a spouse) would not count toward household income if it is under the
applicable threshold that triggers the obligation to file a return. 26 U.S.C. §
6012(a)(1)(A) (2018). An individual may be required to file a tax return for other
reasons, even though he or she is exempt from filing a return under the Code § 6012
rules. For example, if a person has over $400 of income from self-employment, he or
she must file a return to report employment taxes. 26 U.S.C. § 6017 (2018). In addition,
there are many situations where a person will want to file a return even if they are not
required to, e.g., to receive an over withholding refund or a refundable tax credit like the
Earned Income Tax Credit. Rocky Mengle, Kiplinger.com, 7 Reasons to File a Tax Return
Even If You Don’t Have To (Hint: They’re Due July 15!), (Jul. 14, 2020),
https://www.kiplinger.com/taxes/tax-filing/601011/reasons-to-file-a-tax-returneven-if-you-dont-have-to. In such cases, that person’s income should not be counted
toward household income for ACA purposes.
98 26 U.S.C. § 36B(b)(2) (2017).
99 This could be a combination of plans if a single plan cannot cover the entire family,
for example because a child is away at college or because of the relationships between
the family members. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.36B-3(f)(1)–(2), (4) (2017).
100 See
generally Health Reform and Your Insurance Options, WEBMD,
https://www.webmd.com/health-insurance/reform-options#1 (last visited Nov. 21,
2020).
101 Id.
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enroll in the benchmark plan.102 Thus, the cost of the benchmark plan
will vary depending on the taxpayer’s location, family size, and the ages
of the enrollees.103 The Premium Tax Credit amount is the difference
between the premium amount for the benchmark plan and the expected
taxpayer contribution toward the premium.104
The taxpayer’s
contribution varies depending on the taxpayer’s household income and
ranges from 2% of income to 9.5% of income.105 It is important to note
that, although the Premium Tax Credit is based on the benchmark plan’s
cost, the taxpayer is free to enroll in a lower- or higher-cost plan.106
There are several eligibility criteria for claiming a Premium Tax
Credit: (1) the taxpayer107 must have “household income” between
100% and 400% of the poverty line;108 (2) the taxpayer cannot be
eligible to be claimed as the dependent of any other person;109 (3) the
taxpayer must file a joint return if considered married within the

102

26 U.S.C. § 36B(b)(3)(C) (2017).
The ACA permits insurers to charge higher premiums to older insureds; an older
insured may be charged up to three times more than a younger insured. 42 U.S.C. §
300gg(a)(1) (2010). Any age-based adjustment in premiums will be taken into account
under the benchmark plan for Premium Tax Credit calculations. 26 C.F.R. § 1.36B-3(e)
(2017). The benchmark plan, however, will not take into account a premium adjustment
for tobacco use; the ACA allows insurers to charge tobacco users up to 1.5 times the
premium it would charge a non-user. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg(a)(1); 26 C.F.R. § 1.36B-3(e).
104 26 U.S.C. § 36B(b) (2017).
105 26 U.S.C. §§ 36B(b)(2), (3)(A) (2017). The calculation of the taxpayer’s required
contribution is fairly complicated, although online calculators can help taxpayers (and
their advisors) estimate the likely contribution amount. See, e.g., Health Insurance
Marketplace Calculator, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Nov. 21, 2020),
https://www.kff.org/interactive/subsidy-calculator/.
106 26 U.S.C. § 36B(b)(3)(B) (2017); see also Health Reform: Beyond the Basics,
Premium Tax Credits: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions, CTR. BUDGET & POL’Y
PRIORITIES 2, 2 (July 2013), http://www.cbpp.org/files/QA-on-Premium-Credits.pdf.
107 The term “taxpayer” is used because the claimant must file a federal tax return to
receive a Premium Tax Credit and it is the term used in the statute. However, the term
includes individuals who may not pay any federal income taxes, either because their
income is too low to trigger the income tax or because their income tax liability is fully
reduced by available credits, such as the EITC or the Child Tax Credit.
108 26 U.S.C. § 36B(c)(1)(A) (2017). As discussed supra in note 87, eligibility for the
Premium Tax Credit for 2020 is calculated using 2018 poverty figures, and under those
poverty figures, between 100% and 400% of poverty for a single person means between
$12,140 and $48,560 with higher amounts in Alaska and Hawaii. Annual Update of HHS
Poverty Guidelines, 83 Fed. Reg. 2,642 (Jan. 18, 2018).
109 26 U.S.C. § 36B(c)(1)(D) (2017). Notice that this is different than actually being
claimed as a dependent of another taxpayer, despite the language in the FAQs posted on
the IRS’s website. The IRS’s website states that the claimant “cannot be claimed as a
dependent by another person.” INTERNAL SERVICE REVENUE, supra note 89. This is contrary
to the plain language of the statute and likely represents an oversight rather than a
conscious interpretation choice.
103
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meaning of Code § 7703;110 (4) the taxpayer must not be eligible for
government-sponsored coverage such as Medicare, Medicaid, CHIP, or
TRICARE;111 (5) the taxpayer must not be eligible for an employersponsored plan that is affordable and provides minimum value;112 (6)
neither the taxpayer nor any member of the taxpayer’s family113 can be
actually enrolled in an employer-sponsored plan, whether or not the
plan is considered affordable or to provide minimum value;114 and
(7) the taxpayer, taxpayer’s spouse, or taxpayer’s dependent must have
purchased coverage through an exchange and paid the premium for the
coverage.115 There are special rules that apply to non-citizens that are
beyond the scope of this Article.
All of these affordability rules would work perfectly well in the
absence of an individual mandate. Indeed, they have been effectively
increasing enrollment from the beginning, even though the individual
mandate has always been weak. The affordability rules even continued
to effectively boost enrollment after the individual mandate was gutted
by the 2017 Tax Act’s repeal of the penalty tax. It appears that
Americans respond better or equally as well to carrots than to sticks.
III. THE 2017 TAX ACT AND BUDGET RECONCILIATION
A. Background of the 2017 Tax Act
The 2017 Tax Act was passed on December 20, 2017, on a nearly
complete party-line vote, with Republicans voting in favor of the act and
Democrats voting against it.116 Touted as pro-growth tax legislation, one
110

26 U.S.C. § 36B(c)(1)(C) (2017).
26 U.S.C. §§ (c)(c)(2)(B), 5000A(f)(1)(A) (2017). This applies on a month-bymonth basis and is based on eligibility for the plan, not enrollment in the plan. Thus, if
a person meets all the eligibility requirements for a Premium Tax Credit in January, but
becomes eligible for Medicaid starting in February, the person will receive a Premium
Tax Credit only for January, even if the person does not actually enroll in Medicaid. 26
U.S.C. § 36B(c)(2)(B)(i) (2017).
112 26 U.S.C. § 36B(c)(2)(C) (2017).
A plan is considered “affordable” if the
employee’s share of the premium for self-only coverage is 9.5% or less of the employee’s
“household income.” 26 U.S.C. § 36B(c)(2)(C)(i) (2017). A plan is considered to provide
minimum value if it covers at least 60% of the total allowed costs of benefits under the
plan. 26 U.S.C. § 36B(c)(2)(C)(ii) (2017).
113 See supra note 96 for an explanation of the term “family” as used Code Section
36B.
114 26 U.S.C. § 36B(c)(2)(C)(iii) (2017).
115 26 U.S.C. § 36B(c)(2)(A) (2017).
116 In the Senate, with only Senator McCain not voting due an illness, all Republicans
voted in favor of the bill while all Democrats and both Independents voted no. Roll Call
Vote 115th Congress – 1st Session, UNITED STATES SENATE (Dec. 20, 2017),
https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress
111
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of the primary features of the 2017 Tax Act was a permanent reduction
in the corporate tax rate to a flat 21%.117 The 2017 Tax Act, however,
made many other changes to the U.S. tax system, both large and small.
For example, it doubled the estate tax exemption amount which, with
annual inflation adjustments, allows a taxpayer dying in 2020 to pass
$11.58 million estate-tax-free;118 for American businesses doing
business internationally, it adopted a territorial taxation system rather
than a world-wide system with credits for foreign taxes paid;119 it
created a new deduction for certain businesses taxed on a pass-through
basis;120 it allowed a 100% immediate deduction for many new business
investments;121 it doubled the standard deduction amounts for
individual taxpayers;122 it lowered individual income tax rates across
the board;123 it lowered the cap on the home mortgage interest
deduction;124 it instituted a new cap on the deduction for state and local
taxes;125 it doubled the child tax credit;126 it eliminated the personal

=115&session=1&vote=00323. In the House, of those Representatives voting, all
Democrats voted against the bill along with 12 Republicans, while 224 Republicans
voted in favor of the bill. FINAL VOTE RESULTS FOR ROLL CALL 699 (Dec. 20, 2017),
http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2017/roll699.xml. The twelve Republican representatives
who voted against the bill were almost all from California, New York, or New Jersey,
states with high state and local taxes, which would be hit hardest by the new cap on
deducting state and local taxes (one of the dissenting Republicans was from North
Carolina). Sam Petulla, Sean O’Key, and Hannah Lang, The House Republicans Who Voted
‘No’
on
Tax
Reform,
CNN
(Nov.
16,
2017),
https://www.cnn.com/2017/11/16/politics/house-republicans-vote-no-taxbill/index.html.
117 See NAT. ASS’N OF TAX PROFESSIONALS, Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, HR 1, (nd),
https://www.natptax.com/explore/Documents/Tax%20Cuts%20and%20Jobs%20Act
%202017
%20Summary.pdf.; see also Adam Michel, Analysis of the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, THE
HERITAGE
FOUNDATION.
(Dec.
19,
2017),
https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2017- 12/IB4800_0.pdf.
118 2017 Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11061, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017); for 2020
exemption amount, see Rev. Proc. 2019-44.
119 2017 Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 13541(D), 131 Stat. 2054 (2017); for a partial
critique of the international tax changes; see David Kamin, David Gamage, Ari Glogower,
Rebecca Kysar, Darien Shanske, Reuven Avi-Yonah, Lily Batchelder, J. Clifton Fleming,
Daniel Hemel, Mitchell Kane, David Miller, Daniel Shaviro, & Manoj Viswanathan, The
Games They Will Play: Tax Games, Roadblocks, and Glitches Under the 2017 Tax
Legislation, 103 MINN. L REV. 1439, 41-42 (2019).
120 2017 Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11011, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017).
121 2017 Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 13201, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017).
122 2017 Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11021, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017).
123 2017 Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11001, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017).
124 2017 Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11043, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017).
125 2017 Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11042, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017).
126 2017 Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11022, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017).
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exemption amount;127 and it made multiple other changes not listed
here.128 Most of these changes expire or “sunset” in 2025 (a common
feature of tax bills due to the Senate budget reconciliation rules
discussed below), while others are permanent.129
Significantly for this Article, the 2017 Tax Act reduced the shared
responsibility tax to zero.130 While it is commonly misreported that the
2017 Tax Act eliminated the individual mandate, it did not do so; it
lowered the tax that enforces the individual mandate to zero. In other
words, after the 2017 Tax Act, an individual who fails to maintain
adequate health coverage, as required by the individual mandate of the
ACA, faces no penalty; there is no enforcement mechanism for the
individual mandate after the 2017 Tax Act changes.131 At the same time,
the 2017 Tax Act left in place other taxes that were introduced by the
ACA, such as the 0.9% additional Medicare tax and the 3.8% tax on net
investment income, both of which are imposed on higher-income
individuals—a strong indicator that the 2017 Congress thought the rest
of the ACA could stand on its own even without an individual mandate
penalty tax.132
At first glance, it seems odd to reduce the enforcement tax to zero
while leaving in place the mandate itself, until one considers the
procedural posture of the 2017 Tax Act. The 2017 Tax Act was
introduced in the House on November 2, 2017 as H.R. 1 pursuant to
budget reconciliation instructions and was passed using budget
reconciliation authority.133 As explained more fully below, budget
reconciliation is a process that allows Congress to pass budget-related
legislation without the threat of a filibuster in the Senate. This process
allows such legislation to pass with a simple majority in the Senate,
whereas regular legislation is always subject to a threat of a filibuster.
127
128

117.

2017 Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11041, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017).
See generally NAT’L ASS’N OF TAX PROF, supra note 117; see also Michel, supra note

129 See generally NAT’L ASS’N OF TAX PROF, supra note 117; see Michel, supra note 117;
see also Rebecca M. Kysar, The Sun Also Rises: The Political Economy Of Sunset Provisions
In The Tax Code, 40 GA. L. REV. 335 (2006); Manoj Viswanathan, Sunset Provisions In The
Tax Code: A Critical Evaluation And Prescriptions For The Future, 82 N.Y.U.L. REV. 656
(2007) (giving background on the proliferation of sunsetting provisions in tax bills).
130 2017 Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11081, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017).
131 See Id.
132 See 26 U.S.C. § 3101(b)(2) (additional Medicare tax); 26 U.S.C. § 1411 (net
investment tax).
133 Bill
History
in
the
Congressional
Record,
Congress.gov,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/1/history; for general
information on budget reconciliation and tax legislation, see Rebecca Kysar, Tax Law and
the Eroding Budget Process, 81 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 61 (2018).
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Indeed H.R. 1 (which became the 2017 Tax Act) passed the Senate on
the slimmest of margins, 51-48 with one Senator not voting.134 If the
2017 Tax Act were not a budget reconciliation measure, it would
certainly have failed due to a filibuster and a failed attempt at cloture.
B. Budget Reconciliation: Purpose and Practice
The Senate has long had a rule of procedure that allows Senators to
indefinitely extend debate on pending matters—to filibuster.135 The
Senate rules have no limitations on the length of time a debate can last,
which allows any Senator or group of Senators to extend debate until
the chamber recesses.136 Filibuster can effectively prevent any question
pending in the Senate from proceeding to a final vote. Although the
filibuster has been part of Senate procedure since the beginning, the
Senate also has, since 1917, had a rule that allows a supermajority of
Senators (currently 60%) to end a filibuster and proceed to a final vote
on a pending matter following an additional period of debate (currently
30 hours); this is referred to as cloture.137 Commonly proffered reasons
for the filibuster and cloture rules are that they encourage full
deliberation, protect the minority voice in the Senate, and also promote
consensus.138
By the 1970s, Congress became concerned that the filibuster (and
the difficult-to-pass cloture motion) was making passing a budget
difficult. Thus, in 1974, Congress passed the Congressional Budget and
Impoundment Control Act of 1974 that allows certain budget-related

134

See supra note 116.
See S. Res. 285, 113th Cong. § 1 (2013); see also VALERIE HEITSHUSEN & RICHARD S.
BETH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30360, FILIBUSTERS AND CLOTURE IN THE SENATE 4 (2017); see
also Filibuster and Cloture, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/ artandhistory/history/
common/briefing/Filibuster_Cloture.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2020).
136 See S. Res. 285, 113th Cong. § 1 (2013); see also VALERIE HEITSHUSEN & RICHARD S.
BETH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30360, FILIBUSTERS AND CLOTURE IN THE SENATE 4 (2017); see
also Filibuster and Cloture, U.S. SENATE,
https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Filibuster_Cloture.
htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2020).
137 CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98-425, INVOKING CLOTURE IN THE SENATE
1-2 (2017). The cloture rule was added in 1917, so while it has a long history, the
filibuster existed for a long time without the limitation of the cloture rules; see also
Cloture Rule, U.S. Senate, https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/
history/minute/Cloture_Rule.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2020) (describing the history
surrounding the adoption of the cloture rule during President Woodrow Wilson’s
term).
138 VALERIE HEITSHUSEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. 96-548, THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS ON THE
SENATE FLOOR: AN INTRODUCTION 1 (2019).
135
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legislation to pass without threat of filibuster in the Senate.139 A budget
reconciliation bill that qualifies under this procedure will pass on a
simple majority in both chambers, rather than needing the support of
more than sixty Senators (60%) to defeat a potential filibuster.140
Under budget reconciliation, the House and Senate pass a
concurrent budget resolution that gives reconciliation instructions to
committees in each chamber; the budget resolution adopts budget goals
for at least the next five fiscal years and instructs committees in each
chamber to “reconcile” current law with the budgetary goals adopted.141
The committees then create legislation that implements the
instructions, and each chamber votes on the legislation produced by
their committees. If the legislation passed by the House and Senate are
not identical, a conference committee is convened to work out the
differences.142 The concurrent budget resolutions are not binding and
are not subject to veto by the President.143
For example, for fiscal year 2018 (the year the 2017 Tax Act was
passed) the House passed House Concurrent Resolution number 71 as a
budget resolution.144 The Senate also introduced its own budget
resolution,145 but ultimately the Senate amended the House concurrent
resolution and the House accepted the Senate’s amendment.146 The
budget resolution recommended levels for revenue and outlays for the
next ten years (a common practice for budget resolutions) (Section
139 Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344,
88 Stat. 297 (1974) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C. and 31 U.S.C.).
140 Id. at §§ 305(b), (c) (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 1326) (limiting the time for debate in
the Senate).
141 MEGAN S. LYNCH & JAMES V. SATURNO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44058, THE BUDGET
RECONCILIATION PROCESS: STAGES OF CONSIDERATION 1 (2017); see also Policy Basics:
Introduction to the Federal Budget Process, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES,
https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/3-7-03bud.pdf (last updated
Apr. 2, 2020).
142 MEGAN S. LYNCH & JAMES V. SATURNO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44058, THE BUDGET
RECONCILIATION PROCESS: STAGES OF CONSIDERATION 9 (2017); see also Policy Basics:
Introduction to the Federal Budget Process, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES,
https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/3-7-03bud.pdf (last updated
Apr. 2, 2020).
143 David Reich & Richard Kogan, Introduction to Budget “Reconciliation,” CTR.
BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Nov. 9, 2016),
https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/1-22-15bud.pdf.
144 H.R. Con. Res. 71, 115th Cong. (2017).
145 S. Con. Res. 25, 115th Cong. (2017), https://www.congress.gov/bill/115thcongress/senate-concurrent-resolution/25.
146 H.R. Con. Res. 71, 115th Cong. (2017), https://www.congress.gov/bill/115thcongress/house-concurrent-resolution/71/all
actions?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22h.con.res.+71%22%5D%7D&s=1&r=5
(all actions on bill).
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1101), recommended a budget level for specific governmental functions
(Section 1102), and limited the overall increase in the deficit (sections
2001 and 2002).147
A full understanding of the budget reconciliation process is
impossible without considering the impact of the Byrd rule, named after
its proponent, former West Virginia Senator Robert Byrd. The Byrd rule
was unanimously adopted by the Senate as a temporary measure and
was later codified.148 Senator Byrd, and Congress, had concerns that the
budget reconciliation process would be used to pass non-budget related
measures on a simple majority vote, circumventing the filibuster and
cloture procedures that protect the deliberative process in the Senate.
Therefore, under the Byrd rule (in its current form), “extraneous”
provisions cannot be considered by the Senate at any point during the
budget reconciliation process. A provision is extraneous if it: (A) does
not produce a change in outlays or revenues; (B) produces an increase
in outlays or decrease in revenues that does not follow the reconciliation
instructions in the budget resolution; (C) is not in the jurisdiction of the
committee that reported the provision; (D) produces changes in outlays
or revenues that are merely incidental to the nonbudgetary components
of the provision; (E) increases the deficit in any fiscal year after the
period specified in the budget resolution (i.e., the “budget window”);
or (F) recommends changes to Social Security.149
The Byrd rule is not self-executing; a court cannot strike a
provision as violative of the Byrd rule.150 To enforce the Byrd rule, a
Senator must raise a point of order challenging a provision as
extraneous under the Byrd rule.151 The presiding officer of the Senate
then must rule on the point of order.152 If the presiding officer sustains
the point of order, finding the provision extraneous, the provision is
stricken from the legislation.153 If the presiding officer rejects the point
of order, finding the provision to not be extraneous, the provision
remains in the legislation.154 Sixty Senators (60%), however, can vote
to waive the Byrd rule violation, or overrule the presiding officer.155
147

Id.
2 U.S.C. § 644 (2018); BILL HENNIFF JR., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30862, THE BUDGET
RECONCILIATION PROCESS: THE SENATE’S “BYRD RULE” 1 (2016).
149 See 2 U.S.C. § 644(b)(1).
150 Ellen P. Aprill and Daniel J. Hemel, The Tax Legislative Process: A Byrd’s Eye View,
81 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 99, 105 (2018).
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Id.
148
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This is the same supermajority needed to invoke cloture to overcome a
filibuster in a non-budget reconciliation process. In practice, the
presiding officer typically consults with either the Senate Budget
Committee Chair or the Senate Parliamentarian before ruling on a Byrd
rule point of order, depending on the argument for why the provision is
extraneous.156 Furthermore, in practice, sponsors of the legislation
frequently consult with the Senate Parliamentarian before legislation
goes to a final vote, and often before points of order are raised;
members of both parties will raise arguments regarding Byrd rule
compliance with the Parliamentarian off the record. This non-public
process is referred to as a “byrd bath.”157
Clearly, the Senate could not have used the budget reconciliation
process to completely repeal the ACA without a supermajority of
Senators in favor. Recall that the Byrd rule prohibits any provision that
“produces changes in outlays or revenues which are merely incidental
to the non-budgetary components of the provision.”158 Generally
speaking, the application of this provision often is not entirely clear
because it is a standard rather than a bright line rule. The presiding
officer, relying on the parliamentarian, must exercise judgement in
determining whether a particular provision’s budget impact is “merely
incidental” to its non-budget impact.159 The fact that so much of this
decision-making occurs off the record by the parliamentarian makes it
even less certain which provisions are likely to violate the Byrd rule and
which are not.160 Nevertheless, it remains clear that a repeal of the ACA
would violate this provision of the Byrd rule. While ACA repeal would
certainly change the federal budget, the budgetary impact of repealing
the ACA is clearly secondary to the profound policy changes of an ACA
repeal.

156

Aprill & Hemel, supra note 150 at 107.
Id. at 107.
158 2 U.S.C. § 644(b)(1)(A).
159 Aprill & Hemel, supra note 150 at 107.
160 In 1993, the Senate Budget Committee stated “This subparagraph contributes
much of the ambiguity created by [the Byrd rule]. Its language calls for the exercise of
judgment. The Parliamentarian has not laid down any bright-line test to aid that
judgment, and reserves the right to consider each individual case on its merits. The
drafters of this subparagraph wished to prohibit provisions in which policy changes
plainly overwhelmed deficit changes. For example, a nationwide abortion prohibition
might marginally reduce Government spending, but would constitute a much more
significant policy change than budgetary action. The application of this subparagraph,
however, has ranged wider than such plain cases.” WILLIAM G. DAUSTER, BUDGET PROCESS
LAW ANNOTATED 208 n.580 (1993).
157
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IV. CALIFORNIA V. TEXAS AND SEVERABILITY DOCTRINE
A. Background of the California v. Texas Case
In California v. Texas, states and individuals are once again
challenging the constitutionality of the ACA. The provision under direct
attack in California v. Texas is the individual mandate. As explained
above, the individual mandate requires most individuals to maintain
health coverage. In 2012, in National Federation of Independent
Businesses v. Sebelius (“NFIB”),161 the United States Supreme Court
upheld the individual mandate as a constitutional exercise of Congress’
taxing power because the consequence of not maintaining health
coverage was the imposition of a penalty tax.162 Subsequent to that
ruling by the United States Supreme Court, however, Congress passed
the 2017 Tax Act which reduced the tax (called the shared responsibility
payment) that enforces the individual mandate to zero.163 The
challengers in California v. Texas argue that because Congress reduced
the tax to zero, the individual mandate can no longer be considered a
constitutionally permissible exercise of taxing authority.164 The District
Court judge agreed with this argument, holding that the individual
mandate is no longer constitutional.165 The District Court referred to
the Supreme Court’s decision in NFIB, which found that the individual
mandate standing alone would be an unconstitutional overreach,
exceeding Congressional authority, but that the inclusion of a penalty
tax to enforce the individual mandate made the mandate constitutional
under the taxing authority.166 The District Court further found that a tax
set at zero is the same as no tax at all.167 Thus, without a tax, the
individual mandate cannot be upheld under the taxing authority.
The states and individual parties seeking to uphold the ACA
appealed the decision to the Fifth Circuit, which issued a decision on
December 18, 2019.168 The Fifth Circuit agreed with the District Court
that the individual mandate can no longer be considered a constitutional
exercise of Congressional authority—without a tax, the individual
mandate cannot be considered an exercise of Congress’ tax and

161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168

NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
Id. at 2580.
2017 Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97 § 11081, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017).
Texas D.Ct., 340 F.Supp. 3d 579, 585 (N.Dist. Tex. 2018).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 601.
See generally Texas 5th Cir., 945 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2019).

PAREJA (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

2/8/2021 5:57 PM

CALIFORNIA V. TEXAS

97

spending power.169 Because this Article focuses on the severability
question, this Article proceeds on the assumption that these holdings
will be upheld by the United States Supreme Court, although this is far
from certain.170
Having found the individual mandate unconstitutional, the District
Court judge next examined whether the now-unconstitutional
individual mandate could be severed from the rest ACA and determined
that it could not.171 Therefore, the District Court’s ruling strikes down
the entire ACA as unconstitutional because it is not severable from the
individual mandate.172 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit remanded the
severability question to the District Court, instructing it to provide
additional analysis.173 Before the District Court could revisit the case,
the Supreme Court granted cert.174
In determining that the individual mandate is not severable from
the entirety of the ACA, the District Court judge focused on
Congressional intent—whether Congress would have wanted the rest of
the ACA to stand knowing that that the individual mandate was
unconstitutional.175 This court’s analysis did not adequately take into
consideration a very important element of Congressional intent,
however: the particular procedure that Congress used to pass the 2017
Tax Act. The individual mandate was ruled unconstitutional only
because Congress lowered the tax to zero.176 Congress lowered the tax
to zero through the budget reconciliation process, which allows budgetrelated legislation to pass the Senate without threat of a filibuster.177
Congress could not have directly repealed the ACA through the budget
169

See generally id.
The case raises a variety of issues that are outside the scope of this Article. For
example, it is possible that individual mandate continues to be constitutional, even
without a tax to enforce the mandate, because without an enforcement mechanism it
does not alter anyone’s legal rights. This would make the severability question moot.
Another issue in the case is whether the plaintiffs have standing to challenge the ACA.
Arguably plaintiffs have no damages from the individual mandate because it is
effectively non-enforceable without the penalty tax. Another issue is whether the
shared responsibility payment continues to be a tax even though it is now set to zero.
Congress did not repeal the tax or eliminate it from the tax code, but rather set the tax
rate at zero.
171 Texas D.Ct., 340 F.Supp. 3d 579 at 585-86.
172 Id.
173 Texas 5th Cir., 945 F.3d at 369.
174 Texas v. United States, 340 F. Supp. 3d 579 (N.D. Tex. 2018), aff’d in part, vacated
in part, remanded, 945 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. granted sub nom. California v. Texas,
140 S. Ct. 1262 (2020) (No. 19-840).
175 See Texas D.Ct., 340 F. Supp. 3d at 606-607.
176 Id. at 605.
177 See generally 2017 Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017).
170
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reconciliation process, and judges should not allow Congress to
indirectly repeal the ACA through this process.178 Judges should
consider the procedural posture of the legislation in determining
Congressional intent with respect to severability. While the District
Court acknowledged that the 2017 Tax Act was passed using budget
reconciliation authority, and that Congress could not have used this
process to repeal the rest of the ACA, the court did not discuss this
aspect of the legislation in its analysis.179
The Fifth Circuit instructed the District Court to more carefully
consider the intent of the Congress that passed the 2017 Tax Act, and to
use a “finer-toothed comb” regarding which specific provisions of the
ACA are constitutionally inseverable.180 Because the 2017 Tax Act was
passed through the budget reconciliation process, and because the same
process could not have been used by Congress to repeal most other
parts of the ACA, it could not have been the intent of Congress to repeal
the entirety of the ACA. Or if that was their intent, it was an intent that
violated Congress’ own rules of procedure. It also seems clear that
Congress must have intended the rest of the ACA to continue to function
without the individual mandate, because that is precisely what Congress
did in the 2017 Tax Act.
This Article does not argue that provisions of laws can never be
struck down as being inseverable from provisions amended under
budget reconciliation in a manner that makes them unconstitutional.
This practice, however, should be rare. It should be incumbent on
Congress to use a procedure that fully implements its intent, rather than
relying on a court to do so. In other words, if the 2017 Congress
intended to eliminate the individual mandate by lowering the penalty
tax, and if the 2017 Congress intended that the individual mandate be
inseverable from the rest of the ACA, then the 2017 Congress should
have employed a Congressional procedure that would allow it to repeal
the ACA itself rather than asking the court to do so. Judges should
consider the procedural posture of such legislation when making
severability determinations. Simply put, there should be a very strong
presumption that Congress did not intend to alter legislation indirectly
that it could not have altered directly because of the legislative process
used. The hurdle of severability should be high or judges risk engaging
in legislating from the bench. The Fifth Circuit acknowledged that
“[s]everability doctrine places courts between a rock and hard place.”181
178
179
180
181

See Part III, supra.
Texas D.Ct., 340 F. Supp. 3d at 591.
Texas 5th Cir., 945 F.3d at 402.
Id. at 394.
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Severability doctrine rests in large part on a respect for the separation
of powers.182 Because of this, courts should be especially wary of
Congress weaponizing the courts to accomplish indirectly what the
Congress could not accomplish directly. Justice Roberts, during oral
arguments, appeared to be animated by this concern when he asked the
Solicitor General for California, “I think it’s hard for you to argue that
Congress intended the entire Act to fall if the mandate were struck down
when the same Congress that lowered the penalty to zero did not even
try to repeal the rest of the Act. I think, frankly, that they wanted the
Court to do that. But that’s not our job.”183
B. The 2010 Congressional Findings Are Not Dispositive
At the Supreme Court, the respondents are a group of states led by
Texas, the federal government, and individuals Neill Hurley and John
Nantz.184 Collectively, they argue that the 2017 Tax Act made the
individual mandate unconstitutional, that the individual mandate is not
severable from the remainder of the ACA, and that, therefore, the entire
ACA is unconstitutional.
In their briefs before the Supreme Court, the respondents Texas
and the Federal Government each rely heavily on the 2010 ACA
Congressional findings; the Congressional findings refer to the
individual mandate as “essential to creating effective health insurance
markets in which improved health insurance products that are
guaranteed issue and do not exclude coverage of pre-existing conditions
can be sold.”185 Texas argues that this statement acts as an
“inseverability” clause, that the 2017 Congress effectively readopted
these findings by amending the ACA without amending the findings, and
that the Supreme Court should defer to this statement of Congressional
intent and refuse to sever the now-unconstitutional individual mandate
from the rest of the ACA.186
While the 2010 Congress clearly viewed the individual mandate as
an important part of the ACA, Texas tries to convert this into a finding
182 Kenneth A. Klukowski, Severability Doctrine: How Much of a Statute Should Federal
Courts Invalidate?, 16 TEX. REV. LAW & POL. 1, 39-52 (2011).
183 Transcript of Oral Argument at 62-63, California v. Texas (2020) No. 19-840.
184 Texas v. United States, 340 F. Supp. 3d 579 (N.D. Tex. 2018), aff’d in part, vacated
in part, remanded, 945 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. granted sub nom. California v. Texas,
140 S. Ct. 1262 (2020) (No. 19-840).
185 Brief for the Federal Respondents at 37, California v. Texas, No. 19-840 (filed June
25, 2020; Brief for Respondent/Cross-Petitioner States at 37, California v. Texas, No. 19840 (filed June 25, 2020); see also 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(I) (2018).
186 Brief for Respondent/Cross-Petitioner States at 37, California v. Texas, No. 19-840
(filed June 25, 2020).
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that the individual mandate is indispensable.187 In short, Texas is trying
to make the 2010 finding do too much work. It seems clear that the 2010
statement of Congressional findings was an attempt by that Congress to
articulate a basis for the ACA under the Commerce Clause of the United
States Constitution. In fact, all of the findings are described as “effects”
that demonstrate the mandate “is commercial and economic in nature,
and substantially affects interstate commerce.”188 A set of findings
aimed at bolstering an argument that the legislation is constitutional is
entirely distinct from a true inseverability clause.189 If the question is
whether the 2010 Congress would have passed all or large portions of
the ACA without the individual mandate, the 2010 findings do not
provide an answer.
If the question is whether the 2017 Congress functionally
readopted the findings when it passed the 2017 Tax Act, that answer is
also elusive. The 2017 Congress had the benefit of the NFIB decision,
where the Supreme Court explained that the ACA is not a constitutional
exercise of the Commerce Clause power.190 From a political standpoint,
it would not make sense for a legislature to spend time and political
capital tinkering with findings that functionally were a nullity. The 2017
Congress also had the benefit of hindsight and would have understood
that the individual mandate was never as effective at incentivizing
enrollment in insurance as the 2010 Congress apparently assumed it
would be. As explained above, and as noted in an amicus brief filed by a
bipartisan group of economic scholars, the insurance markets
remained stable even in years when there was no tax penalty,
supported primarily by the Premium Tax Credit subsidies and expanded
Medicaid.191 Finally, the 2017 Congress could not have amended the
findings under the budget reconciliation process it chose to use—such a
change in the findings would be violative of the Byrd rule as an
extraneous provision.
187

Id. at 29-31.
42 U.S.C. § 18091(1) (2018).
189 The Supreme Court had an opportunity to rule on a true severability clause in
2020. The Court cited 4 U.S.C. § 125 to justify its decision that certain provisions of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 were inseverable from a provision ruled
unconstitutional. Barr v. American Association of Political Consultants, Inc, 140 S. Ct.
2335, 2349 (2020). 4 U.S.C. § 125 provides: “If a court of competent jurisdiction enters
a final judgment on the merits that— 1. Is based on federal law; 2. Is no longer subject
to appeal; and 3. Substantially limits or impairs the essential elements of sections 116
through 126 of this title, then sections 116 through 126 of this title are invalid and have
no legal effect as of the date of entry of such judgment.
190 See generally NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
191 Br. Amici Curiae for Bipartisan Economic Scholars in Support of Pet’rs at 5,
California v. Texas, No. 19-840 (filed May 13, 2020).
188
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C. The ACA Case Is Not a Frost‐Style Convergent Constitutional
Violation
While neither the District Court nor the Fifth Circuit explored this
remedy, scholars have argued that a court could sever off or invalidate
the provision in the 2017 Tax Act that lowered the shared responsibility
payment to zero.192 Under this argument, California v. Texas does not
present a simple severability question—where a single statute passed
by a single Congress contains both constitutional and unconstitutional
provisions—but rather presents what is known as a “convergent
constitutional violation.”193 A convergent constitutional violation
occurs when there are two statutory provisions, both of which would be
constitutional on their own, but are unconstitutional when read
together. In Frost v. Corporation Commission of Oklahoma,194 the United
States Supreme Court struck down an amendment that rendered an
unamended portion of an existing statute unconstitutional.195 There, an
Oklahoma statute required a permit based on public necessity in order
to operate a cotton gin.196 The plaintiff/appellant obtained a cotton gin
permit upon a showing of public necessity.197 The statute was later
amended by the legislature to add an exception that allowed cotton gins
organized as cooperatives to obtain permits without a showing of public
necessity.198 The Supreme Court found that this scheme of requiring a
public necessity showing for some applicants but not for others violated
the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.199 The remedy that the
Court fashioned was to enjoin the amendment, leaving the original
statute in force, unamended.200
None of the parties discuss this issue in their briefs, although the
Cato Institute filed an amicus brief that relies heavily on the Frost
precedent, arguing that the 2017 Congressional intent should be
ignored, leaving in place the original intent of the 2010 Congress which
called the individual mandate “essential” in its findings and which the
Cato Institute argues is dispositive of 2010 Congressional intent with

192 James Durling & E. Garrett West, Severing Unconstitutional Amendments, 86 U.CHI.
L. REV. 1, 1-2 (2018); Josh Blackman, Undone: The New Constitutional Challenge to
ObamaCare, 23 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 1 (2018).
193 See generally Durling & West, supra note 192, at 7-8.
194 Frost v. Corp. Com. Of Okla., 278 U.S. 515 (1929).
195 Id. at 528.
196 Id. at 517.
197 Id. at 517.
198 Id. at 517.
199 Id. at 528.
200 Frost, 278 U.S. at 528.
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respect to severability.201 Other scholars have argued that Frost paves
the way for the Supreme Court to enjoin the 2017 Tax Act’s lowering of
the tax penalty to zero.202
Frost presents a close, but distinct, situation from the ACA facts,
however. In Frost, the second legislative action did not directly amend
the first legislative action, but instead created a new permitting scheme
for certain entities. Either scheme (requiring a showing of public
necessity or not) would be perfectly constitutional on its own, but read
together it created a scheme where some entities were required to show
public necessity but others were not, which violated equal protection.
In the ACA case, the second legislative action did directly amend the first
legislative action, after taking into account the NFIB holding. The 2017
Congress changed the tax rate of the penalty adopted by the 2010
Congress, which is not a constitutional problem on its own. The
Supreme Court created a saving construction in the NFIB case, however,
and the tax provision is inextricably linked to the mandate because of
that savings construction.203 Thus, the 2017 Tax Act effectively
amended not only the tax provision but also the mandate.204 Whereas
Frost is provision A (first-in-time) plus provision B (later-in-time), the
ACA case is provision AB (first-in-time) minus provision A (later-intime). Frost’s A and B were each constitutional standing on their own,
which contrasts with the ACA case where the individual mandate is
likely not constitutional standing on its own (as decided by the Court in
NFIB). Thus, Frost is not perfectly applicable, although could be
instructive if the Court decides the individual mandate is constitutional
without the penalty tax.
D. If the Individual Mandate Is Unconstitutional, It Is
Severable from the Rest of the ACA
Assuming for the sake of argument that the District Court and the
Fifth Circuit are correct in finding the individual mandate to be
unconstitutional following the passage of the 2017 Tax Act, how should
the Court assess whether the individual mandate is severable from the
rest of the ACA?
201

Br. For The Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae Supporting Resp’ts at 3, California v.
Texas, No. 19-840 (filed July 2, 2020); see also 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(I). Note that one of
the primary authors of The Cato Institute’s brief is Professor Josh Blackman, author of
the one of the law review articles discussing the applicability of Frost to this case.
202 See generally Durling & West, supra note 192, at 9-10.
203 See generally NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
204 Arguably, eliminating the penalty tax violated the Byrd rule because of its impact
on the individual mandate, but a point of order was not raised at the time and a court
cannot enforce the Byrd rule after the fact.
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When a portion of a statute is deemed to be unconstitutional, the
Court must determine whether to allow the remaining parts of the
statute to continue in force without the objectionable portion. Whether
portions of a statute can be separated, or severed, from the
objectionable portions of the statute is essentially a test of legislative
intent—if Congress had known that a portion of the statute would be
found to be unconstitutional, would it have passed the remainder of the
statute anyway?205 The test is not whether Congress would prefer to
include the invalidated provision or not, but whether Congress would
pass the rest of the legislation without the problematic provision.206 In
keeping with the focus on legislative intent, courts strive to save as much
of the legislation as possible. David Gans has described this principle as
“the core command of severability doctrine, a firmly established tenet of
judicial restraint.”207
Both the Fifth Circuit and the District Court cite the leading United
States Supreme Court decision in stating the test for severability:
“Unless it is evident that the Legislature would not have enacted those
provisions which are within its power, independently of that which is
not, the invalid part may be dropped if what is left is fully operative as a
law.”208 The District Court explains that the court first looks to see if
Congress’ intent is evident through statutory interpretation, and if it is,
the court follows that intent.209 If the intent is not evident, then the court
will ask if the rest of the statute is capable of functioning independently;
if it is not, it is presumed that Congress could not have intended them to

205 Kenneth A. Klukowski, Severability Doctrine: How Much of a Statute Should Federal
Courts Invalidate?, 16 TEX. REV. LAW & POL. 1 (2011). Professor Klukowski explains that
the modern severability test is actually a two-part test. First, the court should ask if the
rest of the statute would be fully functional without the excised provision, and if so, then
the statute should be severed, unless it is evident that Congress would not have wanted
that result. Id. at 54-56. Professor Klukowski acknowledges that Congressional intent
is relevant to both parts of his test and that the parts overlap, so it is not surprising that
courts place such heavy emphasis on Congressional intent. Id. at 57. Further, the
Supreme Court has noted that it is “fairly unusual” for a statute to fail the first part of the
test. Barr v. American Association of Political Consultants, Inc., 140 S.Ct. 2335, 2352
(2020).
206 Id.
207 David H. Gans, American Constitution Society Issue Brief – To Save and Not to
Destroy: Severability, Judicial Restraint, and the Affordable Care Act, CONSTITUTIONAL
ACCOUNTABILITY CENTER at 1 (Dec. 9, 2019), https://www.theusconstitution.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/12/Issue-Brief-To-Save-and-Not-to-Destroy-SeverabilityJudicial-Restraint-and-the-Affordable-Care-Act.pdf.
208 Texas D.Ct., 340 F. Supp. 3d 579, 607 (N.D. Tex. 2018), (citing Alaska Airlines v.
Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987)); Texas 5th Cir., 945 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2019) (citing Alaska
Airlines, 480 U.S. at 684).
209 Texas D.Ct., 340 F. Supp. 3d at 607.
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stand alone, and the entire statute will fall.210 The Fifth Circuit explains
the process slightly differently. It starts with asking if the constitutional
parts of the statute are able to operate “in ‘a manner consistent with the
intent of Congress[]’” and then moves onto the inquiry of whether
Congress would have passed such a statute.211
The District Court appears most concerned with not legislating
from the bench by leaving in place a truncated law that Congress did not
actually pass, explaining that “were a court to overplay deference to
sever an inseverable statute, it would embrace the very evil the doctrine
is designed to deter.”212 The Fifth Circuit, stating that “[s]everability
doctrine places courts between a rock and hard place,”213 recognizes not
only the danger that motivates the District Court but also the danger of
a court “invalidating more of the statute than is necessary.’”214 The Fifth
Circuit also acknowledges the duty to preserve as much as a statute as
possible, noting that scholars have described this duty as a presumption
of severability.215
The parties to the case disagree as to which Congress’ intent should
be considered: the intent of the Congress that passed the ACA in 2010
or the intent of the Congress that passed the 2017 Tax Act. The District
Court did not consider this issue because it deemed it to be irrelevant,
since the District Court found that it was the intent of both Congresses
that the rest of the ACA is inseparable from the individual mandate.
There are several problems with this analysis. First, it seems clear that
looking at the intent of the original 2010 Congress alone is insufficient.
The challenge is not to the statute as passed by that Congress but rather
to the statute as amended by the 2017 Congress. Giving due deference
to legislative power, a court could not tie the hands of a later Congress
by looking exclusively at the intent of an earlier Congress. Even if the
2010 Congress that passed the ACA intended the individual mandate to
be inseparable from the rest of the statute, the later-in-time Congress
that amended the individual mandate (through amending the tax that
enforced the mandate) could well have a different intent—an intent
informed by seven years of experience with the statute. Generally
speaking, a later-in-time Congressional action is given priority over an

210

Id.
Texas 5th Cir., 945 F.3d at 394, (citing Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 685.)
212 Texas D.Ct., 340 F. Supp. 3d at 606.
213 Texas 5th Cir., 945 F.3d at 394.
214 Id. (citing Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 546 U.S. 320, 328
(2006)).
215 Id. at 395 (citing Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1945, 1950
n.28 (1997)).
211
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earlier-in-time Congressional action if they are inconsistent.216 Thus,
while the intent of the original Congress is not irrelevant, it is the intent
of the amending Congress that is paramount. A court should not look
solely at the intent of an earlier Congress to determine severability of an
amended statutory provision when it is the amendment itself that
causes the provision to be unconstitutional. Despite this, the District
Court spends most of its decision discussing the intent of the original
2010 Congress, emphasizing the interlocking nature of the ACA’s
provisions and dismissing the intent of 2017 Congress as essentially
unknowable.217
Second, the parties to the case all acknowledge that the Congress
that passed the 2017 Tax Act could not have repealed the ACA directly
because the 2017 Tax Act was passed pursuant to the budget
reconciliation process.218 Despite describing determining the intent of
the 2017 Congress as a “fool’s errand,” the District Court reasoned
(without making an explicit finding) that the intent of the 2017 Congress
must have been against severability because it did not repeal either the
individual mandate or the statement of legislative intent that declares
the individual mandate to be essential, nor did the 2017 Congress
otherwise repudiate severability.219 The court found this intent based
on what the 2017 Congress “did not do” (emphasis in original)—it did
not directly repeal any part of the ACA.220 Indeed, the 2017 Congress
could not have done so because the 2017 Congress was operating under
budget reconciliation authority. The court’s logic cuts both ways.
Congress did not directly repeal any part of the ACA other than the
penalty tax; therefore, it can be inferred that the 2017 Congress did not
intend to dismantle the ACA and would want it to stand even absent an
individual mandate.221
216 Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 266, 101 S. Ct. 1673, 1678 (1981) (in dicta, the Court
recognizes the general rule of construction that “the more recent of two irreconcilably
conflicting statutes governs”); Food and Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 143, 120 S. Ct. 1291, 1306 (2000) (“In determining whether
Congress has spoken directly to the FDA’s authority to regulate tobacco, we must also
consider in greater detail the tobacco-specific legislation that Congress has enacted over
the past 35 years. At the time a statute is enacted, it may have a range of plausible
meanings. Over time, however, subsequent acts can shape or focus those meanings.”).
217 See generally Texas D.Ct., 340 F. Supp. 3d.
218 Id. at 591 (“Congress took no other action pertaining to the ACA. Nor could it. The
reconciliation process limited Congress to doing exactly what it did: reducing taxes.”).
219 Id. at 616.
220 Id. at 617.
221 It seems apparent that the 2017 Congress understood that repealing the penalty
tax (always couched as eliminating the individual mandate) could result in a higher rate
of uninsured Americans and higher insurance premiums, but it also seems apparent that
the 2017 Congress did not envision that the entire ACA would fall. In fact, there was
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Third, in considering whether the individual mandate is severable
from the rest of the ACA, the court should take judicial notice of the facts
that the 2017 Congress would have had about how the ACA has
functioned. It was assumed when the law was passed that the elements
of the ACA were intertwined—that they were essential cogs in a
machine. As discussed above, however, it is notable that the ACA did not
collapse when the Supreme Court made the Medicaid expansion
voluntary, which prompted many states to decline its invitation to
expand Medicaid. It is also notable that many of those original nonexpansion states are now considering Medicaid expansion. It is further
notable that enrollment in marketplace plans has remained fairly robust
despite the fact that the individual mandate has always been a weak
requirement, and that the IRS has not been able to enforce the shared
responsibility payments with the same vigor that it can enforce other
taxes. This is not the pattern one would expect to see with respect to an
indispensable, non-severable legislative provision. Indeed, it appears
that the subsidies in the form of Premium Tax Credits and Cost Sharing
Reductions do far more to urge people toward maintaining health
insurance than the individual mandate ever could.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court is hearing yet another challenge to the
Affordable Care Act. This latest challenge raises unique and challenging
issues about severability. Severability doctrine has long been anchored
in courts’ deference to the intent of the legislature, but this simple
statement obscures difficult questions such as how courts should
determine legislative intent and which intent matters when the
legislative bodies have changed. This Article applies severability
doctrine to the challenge currently before the Supreme Court and
argues that the procedural stance of the legislation that creates a
Constitutional violation should matter to the severability analysis.
Specifically, this Article argues that because the 2017 Tax Act that
created the Constitutional problem was passed via a special
Congressional procedure that could not have been used to revoke the
entire ACA, this fact weighs heavily in favor of severability. To do
otherwise would allow Congress to circumvent its own procedures and

serious consideration about passing a parallel measure that would stabilize the ACA
insurance marketplaces, indicating an assumption that the ACA would continue without
the individual mandate. See generally Thomas Kaplan & Jim Tankersley, Senate Plans to
End Obamacare Mandate in Revised Tax Proposal, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2017,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/14/us/politics/tax-plan-senate-obamacareindividual-mandate-trump.html.
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ask the Court to do indirectly what Congress could not do directly. Such
a result would completely warp the separation of powers principles that
undergird the severability doctrine.

